(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster session at 1:30PM ET)
X: Evidence from Y (Room A)
- Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor Market
Nikhil Garg and Ramesh Johari
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- The Effects of Influencer Advertising Disclosure Regulations: Evidence From Instagram
Daniel Ershov and Matthew Mitchell
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- The Engagement-Diversity Connection: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Spotify
David Holtz, Benjamin Carterette, Praveen Chandar, Zahra Nazari, Henriette Cramer and Sinan Aral
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
Games on Networks (Room B)
- Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
Victor Amelkin and Rakesh Vohra
[ paper | talk ]
- Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk
Steffen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games
Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa and Mohamad Latifian
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
Mechanism Design without Money (Room C)
- Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to Be True
Deniz Kattwinkel
[ paper | flash video | talk ]
- Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz and Yakov Babichenko
[ paper | talk ]
- Characterization of Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space
Authors: Pingzhong Tang, Dingli Yu and Shengyu Zhao
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
Secretaries and Prophets (Room D)
- Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and Augmentations
Nicole Immorlica, Sahil Singla and Bo Waggoner
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- On Optimal Ordering in the Optimal Stopping Problem
Shipra Agrawal, Jay Sethuraman and Xingyu Zhang
[ paper | talk ]
- The Secretary Recommendation Problem
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky
[ paper | talk | poster ]
Revenue Maximization (Room E)
- Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman and S. Matthew Weinberg
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]
- More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPs
Authors: Constantinos Daskalakis and Manolis Zampetakis
[ paper | flash video | talk | poster ]